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Forum Non Conveniens and the
Extraterritorial Application of United States
Antitrust Law
Mais pour l'amour de Dieu, ne laissons pas des querelles de
pacheurs d~ghnbrer en querelles de nations.
-le Duc de Choiseul, 17631
Expansive extraterritorial application of United States antitrust law has
precipitated a political crisis with America's major trading partners. Hos-
tility toward United States policy has prompted these nations to enact re-
taliatory legislation insulating their corporations from the reach of Ameri-
can courts. The political and economic effects of this ongoing dispute
demand attention in order to restore amicable relations and increase the
free flow of trade.2
This Note reassesses antitrust jurisdiction in international transactions,
recognizing that the present dispute is essentially a political one that
courts lack the power and competence to resolve. After tracing the dimen-
sions of the problem, this Note discusses the present interest-based revi-
sionist approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction of antitrust law, and finds
it incapable of effectively resolving the tensions produced by expansive
1. Letter from le Duc de Choiseul to Lord Halifax regarding controversy over Newfoundland
fisheries following the Seven Years' War, 1763, quoted in Soltau, Le Chevalier d 'Eon et les Rela-
tions Diplomatiques de la France et de L'Angleterre, in MPLANGES D'HISTOIXE OFFERTs A M.
CHARLES BtMoNT 655 (1913), cited in Viner, Power versus Plenty as Objective of Foreign Poliy in
the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in REVISioNS IN MERCANTILISM 80 (D. Coleman ed.
1969).
2. The gravity of this problem has precipitated something of a guerre des savants. Commentators
have offered analyses and solutions that differ significantly from those proposed here. See, e.g.,
Dunfee & Friedman, The Extra-Territorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws: A Proposal
For an Interim Solution, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (1984) (arguing that courts should take as many
controversial cases as possible so as to escalate crises and force political branches to respond); Gerber,
The Extraterritorial Application of German Antitrust Laws, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 756 (1983) (com-
parative analysis arguing both for placing conceptual limits on effects doctrine and for use of public
international law to devise method of weighing national interests); Hawk, International Antitrust
Policy and the 1982 Acts: The Continuing Need For Reassessment, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 201
(1982) (proposing appointment and agenda of national commission to study problem); Note, Power to
Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British Clawback Statute Under International Law, 81 COLUM. L.
REV. 1097 (1981) (careful analysis of origins and effects of limiting legislation; concluding it is incon-
sistent with international law and proposing arbitration or negotiation to resolve dispute over applica-
tion of competition laws).
Two comprehensive, continuously updated treatises have been written in recent years that provide
helpful commentaries on the law in this area. J. ATwOOD & K. BREwsTER, AN TRusT AND AMERi-
CAN BUSINEss ABROAD (2d ed. 1981); B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTER-
NATIONAL ANTITRUST. A COMPARATIVE GUIDE (1979).
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application of United States competition laws to international transac-
tions. The Note advocates instead an approach based on the traditional
judicial doctrine of forum non conveniens. Such an approach is capable of
accommodating political and economic interdependence, while sparing the
courts the difficult analyses of law and diplomatic concerns of respective
nations that interest analysis entails.
I. DIMENSIONS OF THE PROBLEM
America's current international antitrust policy reflects America's eco-
nomic dominance after World War II. This dominance enabled Ameri-
can courts to enforce a political preference for free trade and maximum
competition.4 An expansive interpretation of American antitrust laws5
based on a theory of extraterritoriality was consistent with these develop-
ments. This theory, formulated in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America (Alcoa)," determined that American courts had subject matter ju-
risdiction over acts taking place entirely abroad, if the actions were both
intended to1 and did have a demonstrable effect on American commerce.'
3. See Hawk, supra note 2, at 206.
4. See Sornarajah, The Extraterritorial Enforcement of U.S. Antitrust Laws: Conflict and Com-
promise, 31 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 127, 149 (1982) ("[W]hen the United States dominated interna-
tional trade [after World War III, American courts formulated a theory of extraterritoriality which
would have permitted them control over business conduct occurring abroad but having effects in the
American market"); cf. Bressand, Mastering the "Worldeconomy", 61 FOREIGN AFF. 745, 752 (1983)
(United States had overwhelming interest in free trade after World War II). Extraterritorial applica-
tion of the Sherman Act provided a means to effectuate America's interest in free trade by policing
against creeping mercantilism. See generally, Reich, Beyond Free Trade, 61 FOREIGN AFF. 773, 776
(1983) (America's free trade cum intervention philosophy opposes mercantilist intervention by Ameri-
can government because intervention "by assumption distorts production and saps our competitive
strength," yet maintains concurrently that intervention by other governments in their own economies
gives them "unfair competitive advantage") (emphasis in original).
5. The relevant language of the Sherman Act states:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be
illegal . ..
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ...
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1982) (emphasis supplied).
6. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). The Second Circuit was sitting on certification from the Supreme
Court because the high court was unable to constitute a quorum of justices who were not, for various
reasons, disqualified from hearing the case. 1 J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERm-
CAN BUSINESS ABROAD 147 [hereinafter cited as ATWOOD & BREWSTER].
7. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444. Confusion exists over whether the intent requirement of Alcoa is one
of purpose or of foreseeability. Compare ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 6, at 152 (noting that
Hand's concern with international complications arising from expansiveness of effects test suggests
that he would favor showing of purposive conduct) with ANTITRUST Div., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ANTITRUST GUIDE FOR INT'L OPERATIONS 6 (1977), quoted in ATWOOD & BREWSTER, supra note
6, at 152-53 (reading Alcoa as requiring conduct with "substantial and 'foreseeable"' effects).
8. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444; see also Blechman, Antitrust Jurisdiction, Discovey and Enforcement
in the International Sphere: An Appraisal of American Developments and Foreign Reactions, 49
ANTITRUST L.J. 1197, 1199 (1980) (noting trend toward further expansion of subject matter jurisdic-
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Alcoa has led American courts to take jurisdiction over cases where the
effects on the United States are significantly less compelling than those on
the other country.9 The easy entry into American courts allowed by the
effects test,10 combined with other factors,"1 has made American courts
attractive for both foreign and domestic plaintiffs. These factors include
more stringent antitrust laws, the attraction of treble damages,1 2 more
comprehensive discovery rules," jury trials, 4 contingency fees,'3 class ac-
tions,16 and suits by private parties.
17
America's expansive extraterritorial antitrust policy has generated in-
tion such that even absent effects on domestic markets, courts will entertain cases where foreign con-
duct alleged to affect American exports adversely).
9. The status of the effects doctrine in international law remains unresolved. Compare B. HAwK,
UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST. A COMPARATIVE GUIDE
16 (Supp. 1983) ("[G]enerally. . . public international law today does not preclude reliance on an
effects doctrine. . . for jurisdiction.") with Sornarajah, supra note 4, at 136 ("[Tlhe effects doctrine
of jurisdiction. . . does not accord with international law rules relating to jurisdiction."). Revisionists
and foreign observers argue that the effects doctrine is inconsistent with general principles of interna-
tional law, which require that findings of jurisdiction be confined to a territorial basis in order "to
reduce the chaos that would result if several States claimed jurisdiction over an event." Id. at 136; see
also sources cited infra note 44.
10. The lack of a required threshold level of effect for finding jurisdiction means that "[n]o man-
ner of trade between this country and any other is beyond the [Sherman] Act's reach." Kintner &
Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. &
COM. L. REV. 199, 203 (1977).
11. Many of these attractions were specifically recognized by the Supreme Court in Piper Aircraft
Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 252 & n.18 (1981).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); see also Rosenthal, What Should be the Agenda of a Presidential
Commission to Study the International Application of U.S. Antitrust Law?, 2 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 372, 378 (1980) (noting abuse of treble damage remedy) [hereinafter cited as Rosenthal, Anti-
trust Commission].
13. See Rosenthal, Antitrust Commission, supra note 12, at 377. The British have long regarded
the wide-open pre-trial discovery of documents under U.S. law as a court-sponsored fishing expedition
through corporate files. See Radio Corp. of America v. Rauland Corp., [1956] 1 All E.R. 549; Pettit
& Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust
Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 697, 700 (1982). In 1964, these American discovery provisions led Britain to
adopt legislation giving its Secretary of State discretion to withhold commercial documents sought by
foreign courts. See Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Act, 1964, ch. 87.
14. See Smith Kline & French Laboratories v. Bloch, [1983] 2 All E.R. 72, 74 (Opinion of Lord
Denning, M.R.) ("As a moth is drawn to the light, so is a litigant drawn to the United States ....
There is. . . in the United States a right to trial by jury. These are prone to award fabulous dam-
ages. They are notoriously sympathetic [to plaintiffs].").
15. See Note, supra note 2, at 1103.
16. See id.
17. Only the U.S. provides a cause of action under its competition law to private plaintiffs. In all
other developed countries only the government may undertake such proceedings. See Rosenthal, Anti-
trust Commission, supra note 12, at 378. When a government contemplates an antitrust prosecution it
can consider more objectively than a private plaintiff the whole host of economic and political effects
that such a suit would have on other nations as well as its own foreign policy. Because the individual
plaintiff is concerned only with his own welfare, many suits are brought in U.S. courts that other
governments have made affirmative choices not to institute. The result has been a series of ongoing
diplomatic crises. See id. at 378. For a discussion of the availability of private rights of action in the
U.S. for both American and foreign plaintiffs, see Huntly, The Protection of Trading Interests Act
1980. Some Jurisdictional Aspects of Enforcement of Antitrust Laws, 30 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 213,
218-21 (1981).
1695
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 94: 1693, 1985
ternational tension for two reasons."8 First, the intrusive relief that Ameri-
can courts regularly grant 9 significantly disrupts the economic policies of
United States trading partners." Foreign commentators have protested the
absurdity of jurisdiction based on economic effects, arguing that in a sys-
temic world economy effects on the exports of one state a force have recip-
rocal effects on the economy of the importing state.2 1
Second, and more importantly, the American free trade policy ig-
nores political decisions made by other nations to advance competing
and sometimes inconsistent trading policies.2 Many American trad-
ing partners have moved toward "neo-mercantilist" regulatory
policies23  that are contrary to American notions of free trade.
2 '
Other nations encourage export cartels,25 dictation of market arrange-
18. Foreign hostility toward extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust laws is not a recent phe-
nomenon. See Rosenthal, Relationship of U.S. Antitrust Laws to Formulation of Foreign Economic
Policy, Particularly Export and Overseas Investment Policy, 49 ANTrrIRusT L.J. 1189, 1193 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Rosenthal, Antitrust and Overseas Investment]. Foreign governments protested
American antitrust enforcement abroad in the 1950's. See K. BREWSTER, ANTrRUST AND AMERICAN
BUSINESS ABROAD 46-51 (1st ed. 1958); W. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 344-46 (1st ed. 1958). In 1956 one commentator noted that "there is increasing evidence that
our efforts at Sherman Act enforcement are regarded by others as an unwarranted interference in
their internal affairs." Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Toler-
ances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE L.J. 1087, 1148-49 (1956).
19. In applying antitrust law to international transactions, American courts frequently "order (or
enjoin) conduct either in foreign countries or which [has a] substantial effect or impact in foreign
countries." Examples of court-ordered relief include:
1. divestiture of stockholdings in foreign corporations or joint ventures
2. reasonable or good faith efforts to sell abroad
3. reasonable or good faith efforts by foreign competitors to sell in the United States
4. transfer of foreign patent and trademark rights, including compulsory royalty-free licens-
ing of foreign patents and knowhow
5. enjoining the exercise of foreign patents, knowhow and trademark rights.
B. HAWK, supra note 2, at 345-46; see generally id. at 344-64 (detailed discussion of extreme exam-
ples of relief and remedies imposed by American courts).
20. See Feinberg, Economic Coercion and Economic Sanctions: The Expansion of United States
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 30 AM. U.L. REv. 323, 324 (1981).
21. See Mann, The Doctrine of Jurisdiction in International Law, 111 RECFUEL DE CoURS L'
HAGUE ACADEMIE DES Dgorr INTERNATIONALE 1 (1964 i), reprinted in F. MANN, STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 91 (1973); see also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 582 (1953) (recog-
nizing need for mutual forebearance in international cases because of reciprocal nature of bases of
jurisdiction); Katzenbach, supra note 18, at 1150 ("[Alnything that affects the external trade and
commerce of the United States also affects the trade and commerce of other nations, and may have far
greater consequences for others than for the United States.").
- 22. See ATwooD & BREWSTER, supra note 6, at 4 (noting significant growth of antitrust regimes
abroad, which are often different than that of U.S.); Feinberg, supra note 20, at 324.
23. Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 2, at 887.
24. See ATWOOD & BREwsrt_, supra note 6, at 4; Rosenthal, Antitrust Commission, supra note
12, at 376 (noting conundrum of whether jurisdiction should be taken over acts that violate U.S. law
but are in furtherence of policies of foreign governments); Shenefield, Thoughts on Extraterritorial
Application of the United States Antitrust Laws, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 350, 354 (1983) (commenting
that American preference for competition collides with "regulatory regimes" of other nations).
25. Rosenthal, Antitrust Commission, supra note 12, at 376. In many cases, foreign governments
have made conscious policy choices to foster anticompetitive export associations in order to increase
their share of world trade. See Pettit & Styles, supra note 13, at 699 (noting that United States,
United Kingdom, Canada, West Germany, Japan, and Australia promote such associations). These
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ments, 6 and significant cooperation among competitors.2 , The legitimacy
of these policy choices is ignored and their purposes undermined when
plaintiffs use liberal jurisdictional rules and stiff American competition
laws to drag foreign companies into United States courts, exacting treble
damages for conduct that is not only legal but affirmatively encouraged by
the corporation's parent state.28
Several controversial antitrust cases recently brought in American
courts have intensified this tension. In the litigation surrounding the col-
lapse of Laker Airways, engaged American29 and British"0 courts in a
jurisdictional tug-of-war-each trying not only to take jurisdiction but af-
firmatively to deny the jurisdiction of the other tribunal. Similarly, hostil-
ity resulted in In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation1 both because Ameri-
can courts sought to disrupt the affirmatively collusive policies of other
governments, and because four of these governments tried to cooperate
nations regard American insistence that foreign traders act competitively in dealing with the United
States as hypocritical, id., since America specifically allows the formation of cartels for international
trade under the provisions of the Webb-Pomerene Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 61-66 (1982)). See Goldsweig,
Enborg & Walton, The Impact of United States Antitrust Law on the Balance of Trade, 15 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 751, 757 (1982).
26. See, e.g., Note, Potential Havens From American Jurisdiction and Discovery Laws in Inter-
national Antitrust Enforcement, 33 U. FLA. L. REV. 240, 257-58 (1981) (Canada refused to cooper-
ate with American antitrust case because it interfered with market arrangement that Canadian gov-
ernment had sought and approved).
27. See Shenefield, supra note 24, at 354 (discussing various perceptions of role of competition).
28. While the Justice Department notifies and consults with a foreign government when pending
antitrust actions might affect that nation's policies, this attempt at accommodation has "frequently
. . . been deemphasized in favor of the United States national interest in enforcing the antitrust laws
to protect domestic consumers or exporters." Hawk, supra note 2, at 227. Thus America's challenge
to Canadian price-setting for potash prompted a Canadian official to denounce the "arrogant stupidity
on the part of the Government of the United States." Id. at 237-38.
Many foreign governments tend generally to discount American clalms that its antitrust policies are
grounded on neutral values favoring competition and free trade, viewing these laws instead as a "tool
of United States commercial interests." Rosenthal, Antitrust and Overseas Investment, supra note 18,
at 1195.
29. The ongoing controversy surrounding the collapse of Laker Airways has become notorious.
The American court characterized the British law on competition as "offensive" and designed "only to
quash the practical power of the United States courts," Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 937-38 (D.C. Cir. 1984), which would lead to "unfettered chaos," id. at 941.
The court found itself attempting to resolve "a head-on collision between the diametrically opposed
antitrust policies of the United States and the United Kingdom," id. at 916, and concluded that'the
constraints of United States reliance on the effects doctrine lead inevitably either to capitulation by
one party or to deadlock, id. at 954.
30. The British Court of Appeals (Civil Division) in British Airways Bd. v. Laker Airways,
[1983] 3 All E.R. 375, ruled that since the British defendants in Laker's pending antitrust suit in
America were barred by the Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11, reprinted in [Apr.-
June] ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. Ra'. (BNA) No. 959, at F-1 to F-2 (Apr. 10, 1980) [hereinafter
cited as POTI Act], under order of the Secretary of State for Trade, from cooperating with American
courts, an injunction would issue preventing Laker from proceeding in his American action.
31. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1250 (7th Cir. 1980) (twenty-nine do-
mestic and foreign defendants haled into American court over allegations of world-wide uranium
cartel); see also Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 2, at 887-89 (discussing uranium cartel controversy
at greater length).
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with the court by appearing as amid curiae to contest American jurisdic-
tion, only to be dismissed 2 with language so disparaging as to prompt the
embarrassed State and Justice Departments to file a joint protest with the
court.33
Yankee "jurisdictional jingoism" has created wide-spread resentment
4
and prompted America's closest allies to retaliate" by adopting legislation
limiting the reach of the Sherman Act in foreign jurisdictions.3 Contro-
versy over the proper scope of American law led Britain3" to adopt a com-
prehensive statute8 attacking both the substance and the process of Amer-
ican antitrust law39 by limiting the ability of American courts to reach
32. 617 F.2d at 1256.
33. Letter from Roberts B. Owen, Legal Advisor of the Department of State, to John H.
Shenefield, Associate Attorney General (Mar. 17, 1980), reprinted in Nash, Contemporary Practice
of the United States Relating to International Law, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 657, 665-67 (1980).
34. See ATwOOD & BREWSTER, supra note 6, at 4-5, 11 (differing antitrust policies have precipi-
tated political resentment resulting in "overt conflict"); Note, supra note 26, at 261 (assertion of
jurisdiction over case involving collusive marketing of potash, despite Canadian protests, caused more
damage to U.S.-Canadian relations than it benefitted plaintiff by increasing competition). In response
to foreign objections, America has repeatedly, though unsuccessfully, sought to negotiate agreements
with other nations and to cooperate in antitrust enforcement, but that consultation has not reduced the
scope of American law. See Davidow, Extraterritorial Antitrust and the Concept of Comity, 15 J.
WORLD TRADE L. 500, 501 (1981) ("By informal estimate, there have been five diplomatic protests
of U.S. antitrust cases for every instance of express diplomatic support, and three blocking statutes for
every cooperation agreement.").
35. See Samie, Extraterritorial Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws: The British Reac-
tion, 16 INT'L LAW. 313, 317 (1982) ("The POTI Act is a purely retaliatory act."). For excerpts
from a particularly heated British parliamentary debate chastising America's antitrust policies, see
Huntley, supra note 17, at 224. For a similar Canadian rodomontade, see Hawk, supra note 2, at
237. Cf R. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN CURRENT PERSPECTIVE: THE ORIGINS
AND THE PROSPECTS OF OUR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 384 (2d ed. t980) (controversies
stemming from application of U.S. antitrust law in Britain led to "immoderate and inflexible posi-
tions" not in best interests of either country).
36. A compendium of foreign limiting legislation is provided in A. LOWE, EXTRATERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION 79-225 (1983).
37. Forty-one members of the British Commonwealth have adopted a resolution critical of United
States antitrust laws. The resolution has been interpreted as encouraging Commonwealth members to
pass legislation similar to the POTI Act. Commonwealth Nations Adopt Resolution Criticizing U.S.
Treble Damage Judgments, [Apr.-June] ANTrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 963, at A-10
to A-1I (May 8, 1980).
38. POTI Act, supra note 30. For a thorough, well-reasoned analysis of this Act and its validity
under principles of international law, see Note, supra note 2.
39. The POTI Act is colloquially known as the Blocking and Clawback Statute. The blocking
portion allows the British Secretary of State for Industry to excuse British nationals from compliance
with foreign antitrust judgments, § 1-(3), strictly limits discovery, § 2-(1), and grants the Secretary
power to force British plaintiffs to withdraw from foreign antitrust actions if the judgment received
would be enforceable against British defendants, § 1-(3), -(5).
Clawback refers to two sections of the Act. Section 5 declares foreign multiple damage judgments
unregisterable for reciprocal enforcement in British courts. In the case of an American antitrust ac-
tion, this would deny enforcement of both the punitive two-thirds of the damages and the compensa-
tory one-third. The effect of the Act has been to insulate British defendants from treble damage
liability. See Note, Enjoining the Application of the British Protection of Trading Interests Act in
Private American Antitrust Litigation, 79 MIcaH. L. REv. 1574, 1577-78 (1981).
Section 6 provides that British defendants may recover in British courts the punitive portion of any
damages, previously awarded, in an action against the foreign plaintiff. Section 7 provides that the
British will reciprocate in enforcing judgments to clawback punitive damages for nations extending
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defendants or documents abroad.4 ° Other nations have followed suit.41
Because expansive application of United States antitrust policy in the
international context ascribes little legitimacy to countervailing foreign
policy choices, it has created a situation of international political tension.
Judges have responded to this political conflict either by ignoring com-
pletely the international dimensions of their actions42 (by reliance on the
effects test), or by recognizing the diplomatic implications of the contro-
versy and attempting to resolve the controversy by application of funda-
mentally political criteria to achieve a politically desired result"3 (by
means of interest analysis). The former approach generates needless dip-
lomatic tension; the latter thrusts courts into a role that they cannot per-
form effectively and should not play in a democracy.
II. THE FAILURE OF THE INTEREST-BASED REVISIONIST APPROACH
Some American courts have chosen to recognize rather than to ignore
the disruptive political implications of expansively applied competition
law. These courts have resolved international antitrust controversies by
analyzing and balancing political and diplomatic criteria called "inter-
ests." Case law flowing from this "revisionist" approach"4 at one time
seemed to offer the promise of mollifying tensions by adopting a balancing
of government interests for its jurisdictional analysis.45 But interest analy-
that courtesy to Britain-creating an incentive for others to follow suit. See Note, supra note 26, at
265-66.
40. The Act was prompted in part by outrage over the aggressive American prosecution of the
uranium cartel case. See In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979),
af'd, 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980). But the POTI Act also represents general retaliation by the
British for the failure of the U.S. to respond to British complaints. See Samie, supra note 35, at
317-19.
41. Other nations with their own version of blocking and/or clawback statutes include Canada,
Australia, South Africa, the Netherlands, Italy, West Germany, France, and Belgium. Pettit & Styles,
supra note 13, at 707-14.
At the same time, West Germany and the European Economic Community have also enacted regu-
latory legislation at least as strict as the Sherman Act. See Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 2, at 887;
Hawk, supra note 2, at 207, 232. Such enactments should not be viewed as an endorsement of Ameri-
can policy. Instead they were motivated by defensive considerations-a desire to meet the United
States policy head-on with a policy as expansive in application as is the Sherman Act-in hopes of
thereby forcing the American government to reconsider its policy. See, e.g., Gerber, supra note 2, at
756.
42. See, e.g., Sabena, 731 F.2d at 949 (court will not engage in interest balancing because "[a]n
English or American court cannot refuse to enforce a law its political branches have already deter-
mined is desireable and necessary.") (italics omitted).
43. See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Sav. Ass'n, 549 F.2d 597,
614 (9th Cir. 1976); cf K. BREWS'rm, supra note 18, at 446 (interest factors used by courts "are a
response to essentially political rather than economic and business considerations.").
44. Revisionist interpretations of international antitrust jurisdiction are enunciated in Timberlane,
549 F.2d 597; Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); ATwOOD &
BaEwsTER, supra note 6; B. HAWK, supra note 2.
45. The revisionist approach was properly viewed as a departure from the effects test of Alcoa,
and was followed, at least in spirit, by three circuits. See Montreal Trading v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d
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sis is both inappropriate and unworkable because it involves courts in
weighing sensitive political and diplomatic concerns traditionally consid-
ered nonjusticiable.
A. Timberlane and Interests
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America National Trust & Sav-
ings Association46 (Timberlane) is the seminal revisionist case. Having
established jurisdiction by a showing of substantial effect, as in Alcoa, the
Timberlane court based its decision to exercise jurisdiction on an analysis
of comity.47 The court viewed comity not as a jurisdictional test per se,
but rather as a factor that gave the trial judge some discretion to decline
jurisdiction in the interest of harmony with other nations.
To evaluate comity, the court employed a conflict-of-laws 4s analysis of
relative governmental interests,49 specifically offering eight factors to be
considered in striking such a balance 50 once the extent of the conflict was
864, 869, 871 (10th Cir. 1981) (denying extraterritorial application of American antitrust laws using
Timberlane approach), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98
(listing ten factors central to determination of whether to exercise jurisdiction); cf. Industrial Inv. Dev.
Corp. v. Mitsui, 671 F.2d 876, 884-85 n.7 (5th Cir. 1982) (comity relevant but not part of jurisdic-
tional test), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007, reaff'd, 704 F.2d 785 (per curiam), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 393
(1983).
More recent decisions suggest that the revisionist approach may well be an aberration from an
otherwise consistently expansionist case law. See, e.g., Sabena, 731 F.2d at 948 (refusing to engage in
Timberlane-style balancing of interests); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1255
(comity merely a factor for district court to consider in deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction once it
was established).
46. Timberlane, 549 F.2d 597 (plaintiff alleged conspiracy in both America and Honduras to
drive Timberlane's Honduran subsidiaries out of business of exporting lumber to United States).
47. Comity, according to the Supreme Court, is neither a matter of obligation nor of good will.
"[I]t is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to
the rights of its own citizens. . . ." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895); accord Sabena,
731 F.2d at 937 ("IT]he central precept of comity teaches that, when possible, the decisions of foreign
tribunals should be given effect in domestic courts, since recognition fosters international cooperation
and encourages reciprocity, thereby promoting predictability and stability. . . . The interests of both
forums are advanced."). Comity merely permits, but does not require, application of foreign law.
Sabena, 731 F.2d at 938 (comity need not be extended if domestic law clearly intended to reach
conduct in question); J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §33 (1834) (comity is
matter of convenience rather than obligation); Akehurst, Jurisdiction in International Law, 46 Bare.
Y.B. INT'L L. 1972,1973, at 145, 218, (1975) (comity imposes "no duties to apply foreign law");
Gerber, supra note 2, at 759 (comity is discretionary); Holmes, Government Antitrust Actions and
Remedies Involving Foreign Commerce: Procedural and Substantive Limitations, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L.
& Bus. 105, 120 (1982) (same).
48. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 40
(1965) offers a definition of conflict of law. "Where two states have jurisdiction to prescribe and
enforce rules of law and the rules they may prescribe require inconsistent conduct upon the part of a
person, each state is required by international law to consider, in good faith, moderating the exercise
of its enforcement jurisdiction . .. ."
49. The court must consider "whether the interests of, and links to, the United States-including
the magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce-are sufficiently strong, vis-A-vis those of
other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority." Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
50. Timberlanie, 549 F.2d at 614:
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determined. A court would exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction only if the
forum government's interests in adjudicating the controversy were suffi-
ciently compelling. This list of factors constituted a "jurisdictional rule of
reason"51 requiring the courts to ascertain the potential degree of conflict
that an American trial would precipitate.52
B. The Limits of Timberlane
Interest analysis, as proposed by Timberlane and the other revisionist
cases, 53 is neither legitimate nor workable." Interest analysis is inappro-
priately applied to extraterritorial antitrust cases because the "interests" it
purports to examine properly fall within the domain of the political
branches. Timberlane directs courts to weigh relative conflicts between the
law and policy of the respective states, the likelihood of compliance by
foreign states with American court decisions, and the relative effects on
the various nations. 5 These "interests" are not legal principles of the sort
courts normally apply; they plainly require a court to take account of
sensitive diplomatic matters 6 and require qualitative assessments of the
political choices and economic policies57 of foreign governments.58
The elements to be weighed include the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, the
nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of business of
corporations, the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve com-
pliance, the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those else-
where, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, the
foreseeability of such effect, and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct
within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. A court evaluating these factors
should identify the potential degree of conflict if American authority is asserted.
51. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613. Kingman Brewster coined the phrase. K. BREWSTER, supra
note 18, at 446.
52. Rosenthal, Antitrust and Overseas Investment, supra note 18, at 1193-94.
53. See cases cited supra notes 44-45.
54. Despite the initial praise for Timberlane's break with the Alcoa effects test, and speculation
that it indicated a shift away from the expansive jurisdiction of the effects test toward a more limited
interest approach, see B. HAwK, supra note 2, at 44, many courts and commentators have found the
balancing of interests approach useless. See, e.g., Sabena, 731 F.2d at 951 (rejecting interest approach
because no correlation between economic realities of transactions at issue and interest-balancing
formula); cf. Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MCH. L. REv. 392,
392 (1980) ("Interest analysis merely substitutes one set of metaphysical premises for another.");
Gerber, supra note 2, at 781 (interest analysis lacks "a conceptual structure"); Maier, Extraterrito-
rial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Between Public and Private International Law,
76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 317 (1982) (interest analysis "will usually reflect an understandable bias in
favor of the forum's policy"); Reese, Book Review, 16 U. TORONTO L.J. 228, 229 (1965) (reviewing
B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFICT OF LAws (1963)) (criticizing Currie's governmen-
tal interest theory as simplistic) [hereinafter cited as Reese, Book Review].
55. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
56. Sabena, 731 F.2d at 949 (balancing "generally incorporate[s] purely political factors which
the court is neither qualified to evaluate comparatively nor capable of properly balancing."); K.
BREWSTER, supra note 18, at 446; Dunfee & Friedman, supra note 2, at 906.
57. See Note, The Use of Interest Analysis in the Extraterritorial Application of United States
Antitrust Law, 16 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 147, 178 (1983).
58. These are not simple cases where one state's interests are obviously paramount. Instead, they
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The traditional response of American courts when presented with such
matters has been to declare them nonjusticiable and to leave their resolu-
tion to the political branches. 9 This reflects the view both that a determi-
nation of competing interests of two sovereign states is "a political func-
tion of a very high order""0 which is properly committed to the elected
branches,"' and that courts are functionally ill-equipped to undertake this
sort of analysis.
1. The "Political Function" of Interests
Courts avoid rendering determinations beyond their constitutional com-
petence by using the political question doctrine. Relevant indicia of a non-
justiciable question include the court's inability to secure information nec-
essary for reasoned decision,6" the implication of the responsibilities of the
political departments, 3 the dearth of well-defined criteria for judicial
decisionmaking," and the appearance that the courts are no longer able to
act as neutral arbiters of law.65 Timberlane's method of decision impli-
cates each of these aspects of nonjusticiability.
require a complex analysis of the stated policies and underlying, often unstated, policy objectives of
entirely different national systems. J. CASTEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS 45 (2d ed. 1968). Even identically
worded statutes adopted by two different governments should not be presumed to represent identical
interests, for "different policies or policies of different intensity may underlie" such statutes. Reese,
Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 315, 316 (1972) (discussing general prob-
lem of resolving transborder choice of law questions) [hereinafter cited as Reese, Choice of Law]. The
result is not a generally applicable choice of law rule, but rather a prescription for case-by-case
adjudication.
59. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 71-72 (1978). Professors Dunfee and
Friedman have likewise argued that the only feasible way to resolve the problem of extraterritorial
application is through "legislation [rather] than through adjudication." Dunfee & Friedman, supra
note 2, at 917. They trace a number of possible legislative responses. Id. at 916-22.
60. Cf. Currie, Notes on Methods and Objectives in the Conflict of Laws, 1959 DUXE L.J. 171,
176 (assessing value of competing legislative interest "is a function which should not be committed to
courts in a democracy. It is a function which the courts cannot perform effectively, for they lack the
necessary resources.").
61. See Katzenbach, supra note 18, at 1153; Ruiz, Interest-Oriented Analysis in International
Conflict of Laws: The American Experience, 23 NETHERLANDS INT'L L. REv. 5, 39 (1976); Scharpf,
Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517, 575 (1966).
62. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939) (noting large volume of information
needed on "political, social and economic" conditions in order to resolve certain legal questions sug-
gests such matters are more "appropriate for the consideration of the political departments of Govern-
ment.") (Court will not review propriety of contested state legislative procedures used in vote on
proposed amendment to U.S. Constitution).
63. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) (while not completely beyond scope of judicial
cognizance, courts are usually reluctant to review questions implicating foreign policy determinations
because "resolution of such issues frequently turn[s] on standards that involve the exercise of a discre-
tion demonstrably committed to the executive or legislature.").
64. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 226 (political questions characterized by "lack of judicially
manageable standards" for resolving them); Coleman, 307 U.S. at 453-54; see also Jaffe, Standing to
Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1265, 1304 (1961) ("question is one for
the decision of which there are no well-developed principles").
65. See Scharpf, supra note 61, at 576 ("As an unfailing support for the rightness of American
claims. . . would jeopardize the integrity of the judicial process, the political question doctrine is a
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First, proper resolution of international antitrust cases requires access
to a great deal of reliable information68 on the internal policy determina-
tions of foreign governments.17 Hostility to American law has made pro-
curing such data directly from governments extremely unlikely. 8 Further,
the limits that other governments have imposed on discovery inhibit neces-
sary fact-finding.69
Second, the President, with the approval of Congress, has responsibility
for the conduct of foreign relations."0 Ultimately, these policies must be
"defined, presented and defended by the political departments of the gov-
ernment. ' 71 The courts have only a limited role in unsettled areas of for-
eign affairs.71
Third, as Chief Justice Hughes recognized more than forty-five years
legitimate means for the Court to delimit its responsibility in international conflicts."); ef. Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. at 213 (noting need for finality in foreign policy determinations, while recognizing
dangers of appearing to defer out of habit rather than reason).
66. By what technique would a court apprise itself of foreign interests and political concerns?
Courts formerly deferred to the State Department as to whether hearing a case would conflict with
foreign interests, see, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 432 (1964), but that
approach is less favored now. A court might rely on the defendant to "present all national interest
factors favoring dismissal," Note, The Inconvenient Forum and International Comity in Private
Antitrust Actions, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 399, 419 (1983) [hereinafter cited as FORDHAM Note], but
defendants are unlikely to interpret such policies objectively. Courts might request amicus briefs when
governments are involved in the suit, Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the
Sherman Act: Encouraging the Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 Nw. J. IN'L L. & Bus. 130,
163 (1982), but in private actions courts must decide who may speak for foreign concerns. Even if
they asked foreign governments to intervene, a government might refuse to recognize the jurisdiction
of American courts to decide the matter by appearing specially. See Rahl, International Application
of American Antitrust Laws: Issues and Proposals, 2 Nw. J. Icr'L L. & Bus. 336, 363 (1980).
Moreover, what is to be made of legislative silence? Balancing of interests requires normative judg-
ments based on ascertainable policies, see Westen, Comment, False Conflicts, 55 CAL L. REv. 74,
81-82 (1967), and yet it is not clear whether a country's lack of a competition statute is an official
statement that the government does not wish to regulate such conduct or simply that the legislature
has not considered the matter.
67. Cf. Scharpf, supra note 61, at 567. "Judicial competence to decide may be doubtful if the
Court is not assured of full clarification of all relevant questions of fact and law" at least when a lack
of information affects an individual case; when there is a general lack of access to information, it
might be more appropriate to adopt "an unqualified limitation upon [court] power," id., as this Note
suggests.
68. See supra notes 18-43 and accompanying text.
69. See R. von Mehren, Perspective of the US Private Practitioner, in EXTRA-TERRITORIAL
APPLICATrON OF LAWS AND RESPONSEs THERETO 203 (C. Olmstead ed. 1984) ("[T]he blocking
statutes which other countries have enacted to curb American discovery may inhibit the efforts of
parties to American litigation to prosecute or defend an action.").
70. The President's primacy in foreign affairs derives from his constitutional status as Com-
mander in Chief of the military, U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1, from his power to conclude treaties
and to appoint ambassadors, id. at cI. 2, and from his duty to receive ambassadors of other nations, id.
at § 3.
71. Scharpf, supra note 61, at 575.
72. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 431-37 (1964) (Court will
avoid decisions drawing into question the acts of foreign governments due to difficulty of inquiry); R.
FALK, THE ROLE OF DOMESTIC COURTS IN THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAl. ORDER 111 (1964) (when
no clear consensus on international norms governing such questions exists, domestic courts must as-
sume "passive" role by avoiding decision); cf. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (1982) (Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act defines court jurisdiction in this area).
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ago, one hallmark of a political question is the need for "appraisal of a
great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic" where
there are simply no useful criteria for judicial determination." Such mat-
ters are non-justiciable and belong to the political departments. 74 Cases
implicating foreign affairs constitute paradigmatic political questions be-
cause resolution of such cases requires policy determinations where there
are no well-developed guiding principles."5 The lack of useful principles
for interest analysis is exemplified by the failure of courts and commenta-
tors to agree even on a definition of an "interest" and its constituent
elements. 6
Finally, no matter how carefully done, it is unseemly for courts to enter
the political thicket of foreign relations. 7  Unquestioning support for the
executive branch calls into question the courts' institutional integrity. If
judges act independently, however, they may preempt the formulation of
policies by the Executive or the Congress for which the latter two
branches are together accountable."9 Conversely, any efforts by the politi-
cal branches to ignore or defy court decisions will diminish the respect and
authority upon which the courts' legitimacy depends."0
73. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939).
74. Chicago & S. Air Lines Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (courts will
not apply usual principles of judicial review to presidential decisions as to international air routes
because cases impinging on foreign policy "are and should be undertaken only by those directly re-
sponsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which
the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility.").
75. See Jaffe, supra note 64, at 1304.
76. See, e.g., Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614 (eight factors define interests); Mannington Mills, 595
F.2d at 1297-98 (ten factors); K. BREWSTER, supra note 18, at 446 (six factors); RESTATEmENT
(SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 40 (five factors).
77. Professors Dunfee and Friedman, supra note 2, recognize the undesireable nature of court
involvement in these political questions and argue for a legislative solution. But, surprisingly, they
offer an "interim" proposal to focus attention on the problem through congressional passage of a
statute forcing courts to run straight into the political thicket. The proposed statute would mandate
that jurisdiction be found as broadly as possible so as to precipitate a diplomatic crisis that would in
turn force Congress to address the main issue. Id. at 932.
This proposal is misguided for two reasons. First, it is illogical, both for the reasons developed in
this Note at text accompanying notes 53-80, and for those that Dunfee and Friedman themselves
develop, supra note 2, at 916-22, to thrust the courts into a diplomatic role that they are not compe-
tent to perform. As these authors themselves argue, courts are simply not capable of reading and
responding to the vicissitudes of foreign policy. Id. at 906 ("Courts will have no reference points when
analyzing the political questions. Precedent is of little value because foreign relations and policies
constantly shift and change.").
Second, the proposal requires congressional adoption of an amendment to strip American courts of
their ability to decline cases on comity grounds. Id. at 924-25. How this provides a solution to the
present problem is a mystery. The goal should not be to make American laws even more annoying so
as to chide foreign governments into recognizing the need for revision of the Sherman Act; rather it
must be to get the United States Congress concerned enough to reconsider the problem. Once congres-
sional inertia is overcome, it is more plausible to expect that Congress will act to craft a solution,
rather than merely to create a mechanism that will force it to act a few years later.
78. See Scharpf, supra note 61, at 576.
79. See id.
80. See Jaffe, supra note 64, at 1307.
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2. The Unworkability of "Complex Exercises in Comparative Law"
Beyond the fact that the court role entailed in interest analysis is pru-
dentially inappropriate, the approach itself is unworkable.81 First, as
noted above, procuring the necessary information is difficult given foreign
hostility to American law. 2 Second, even if all of this information could
be aggregated, a court faces the daunting task of assigning relative weights
to standardless factors of unequal importance and arriving at a reasoned
judgment as to whether United States jurisdiction should be exercised.8"
The Timberlane factors serve only to identify the existence or absence of a
conflict; they do nothing to guide courts in choosing the appropriate dispo-
sition of a conflict." The Supreme Court has said that courts must not
attempt "complex exercises in comparative law" 85 -and courts cannot do
so effectively."
Third, even if courts were able to undertake such a balancing, the over-
whelming tendency when presented with a request to balance interests is
for courts to resolve the conflict, not by seeking to determine if the foreign
forum is actually interested in the case, "but rather by asking
whether-in light of forum policy-that declared interest seems reason-
able.18 7 The result, predictably, is the application of the lexfori88 Of the
81. As one commentator dryly noted, determining jurisdiction by interest analysis is "more akin to
tottering than to balancing." Olmstead, Concluding Remarks, in EXTRA-TERRrrOPiAL APPLMcATION
OF LAWS AND RESPONSES THERETO, supra note 69, at 235. The complexities of full-scale interest
analysis under the Timberlane criteria are set out in Kadish, supra note 66, at 156-62.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 68-69.
83. See Sabena, 731 F.2d at 916 ("The intersection of these issues confronts us with the Hercu-
lean task of accommodating conflicting, mutually inconsistent national regulatory policies while mini-
mizing the amount of interference with the judicial processes of other nations that our courts will
permit."); f Currie, supra note 60, at 176 (when several states have different policies, court is in no
position to weigh competing interests); Gerber, supra note 2, at 781 (noting that interest analysis
gives courts standardless factors that cannot be used predictably); Reese, Choice of Law, supra note
58, at 317 (interest analysis ultimately requires courts to use standardless factors to render ad hoc
decisions).
84. Sabena, 731 F.2d at 948-49 (interest factors are neutral and provide no guidance in resolving
the conflict of law question).
85. Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 251 (1981) (Court declines to resolve choice of law
question; instead dismisses tort claim arising from airplane crash in Scotland on forum non con-
veniens grounds ).
86. See Sabena, 731 F.2d at 949-50 (rejecting use of interest factors noted in Timberlane as
unworkable "[gliven the inherent limitations of the Judiciary"); Baxter, Antitrust in an Interdepen-
dent World 6-7 (Sept. 29, 1981) (speech before American Bar Association Section on International
Law) reprinted in 1 J. ATwOOD & K. BREWSTER, ANTrIRUST AND AmERICAN BusINESS ABROAD
36 (2d ed. Supp. 1984) (courts should not take on executive branch responsibilities by making this
type of judgment as most are unequipped to do so); Shenefield, supra note 24, at 353-54 ("[Tlhe
flaws in this three-step [Timberlane] approach begin to emerge almost as soon as the threshold in-
quiry into personal jurisdiction is begun.").
87. Westen, supra note 66, at 85.
88. Cf Akehurst, supra note 47, at 185-86 (discussing the "'homeward trend"' to apply domestic
law, if possible, in choice of law determinations); Ehrenzweig, The Lex Fori-Basic Rule in the
Conflict of Laws, 58 MicH. L. Rav. 637, 643 (1960) (resolution of political factors leads to applica-
tion of lexfor); Maier, supra note 54, at 317 (attempting to balance interests yields "homing ten-
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recent decisions of American courts using the interest analysis suggested
by Timberlane, there are "none where United States jurisdiction was de-
clined when there was more than a de minimis United States interest."89
Fourth, were courts able to overcome this lex fori tendency, the fact
that there is no way to standardize the relative importance of interest fac-
tors would undermine the predictable application of United States law.90
Only if the factors that prompt an American court to decline extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction are relatively unambiguous and easily applied can eco-
nomic actors predictably structure transactions. The largely standardless
balancing required by Timberlane cannot yield such results.91
Finally, Timberlane fails to achieve its underlying objective of alleviat-
ing the political tensions surrounding extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act because its proposed solution is merely comity. Comity
means only that a balancing of foreign government interests is appropri-
ate; it in no way dictates the proper outcome of that balancing.92 An ap-
proach that focuses only on process cannot reduce hostility that ultimately
derives from outcome. Only the dismissal of suits to more convenient for-
eign tribunals can reduce the present political tensions.
III. FORUM NON CONVENIENS
Interest analysis represents one possible, albeit misplaced, judicial re-
sponse to the tensions arising from the expansive Alcoa jurisdictional test.
A better response to the challenge of selecting cases appropriate for
United States jurisdiction, that would also obviate the need for "complex
exercises in comparative law,"93 would be to return to the juridical princi-
dency" in choice of law cases).
89. Sabena, 731 F.2d at 950-51 (emphasis in original); see also cases discussed supra note 45;
Daishowa Int'l v. North Coast Export Co., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 164,774, 71,789-90 (N.D.
Cal. 1982) (real interest of American courts in resolving case against American corporation trumps
speculative Japanese interests); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D.
111. 1979) (courts cannot properly balance economic and social policies of foreign countries); A.G.S.
Electronics v. B.S.R. (U.S.A.), 1979-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 162,684, 77,849-50 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (ef-
fect abroad not sufficient to overcome American interest in consumer protection); ATWOOD & BREW-
STER, supra note 86, at 38 ("[Clourts have not yet developed smooth, workable methods and stan-
dards to implement the Timberlane balancing process."); Hawk, supra note 2, at 241 ("[Tihe large
majority of courts employing a Timberlane approach nevertheless have exercised jurisdiction.");
Maier, supra note 54, at 297 (courts "have not produced an effective synthesis of relevant values to
characterize the interrelationship between international power and wise national policy.").
90. See Maier, supra note 54, at 319 ("[Nlceds of the states and their subjects in the international
community will not be well served unless the value of predictability is given high priority"); Reese,
Choice of Law, supra note 58, at 316 (predictability important for planning future conduct); Reese,
Book Review, supra note 54, at 230 ("[T]he expectations of the parties should be protected.").
91. See Baxter, supra note 86, at 36 (considerations of international interests "would inject an
inappropriate degree of unpredictability" into the law); Gerber, supra note 2, at 781; Shenefield,
supra note 24, at 369 (Timberlane balancing is not predictable).
92. See Gerber, supra note 2, at 781.
93. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 251; see also Note, Forum Non Conveniens: Standards for the Dismissal
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ples of self-restraint embodied in the common law doctrine of forum non
conveniens.94 This doctrine offers a method for selecting the best forum
for those cases at the margins of jurisdiction which might properly be
heard in any number of fora. 5
A. The Proposed Approach
A grant of a motion of forum non conveniens results in the dismissal of
an action brought in one court, allowing the plaintiff to take the case to
another forum98 where greater availability of witnesses and evidence sug-
gests that the case can be heard more effectively, efficiently, and conve-
niently. The defendant's objection in such a motion is typically not a chal-
of Actions from United States Federal Courts to Foreign Tribunals, 5 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 533, 559
(1982) (courts should avoid complicated choice of law determinations in international context).
94. At least one other author has argued that the proper reach of American antitrust law can be
settled by means of aforum non conveniens analysis. See FORDHAM Note, supra note 66. Significant
differences exist between that approach and the approach taken in this Note, however, despite use of
similar nomenclature.
That author argues that the weakness of the Timberlane interest analysis lies in its failure properly
to regard the need for an "adequate alternative forum," and in Timberlane's solicitude for "national
concerns [which] ignores the litigants' interests." Id. at 418. The author of the Note would merely
expand the list of interest factors, which Timberlane previously identified for determining the appro-
priateness of the forum, by considering two additional factors.
This Note advocates a signficantly different approach. Rather than rely on an interest-based con-
flict of laws analysis, this Note argues for a contacts analysis based on the forum non conveniens
factors identified by the Supreme Court in Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). The
distinction is not merely academic. As discussed supra at text accompanying notes 53-92, the
processes of balancing interests and conducting "complex exercises in comparative law" are both diffi-
cult and disfavored by the Supreme Court. The author of the FORDHAM Note alms to remedy this by
factoring in additional considerations. Having to consider more interests can only make the balancing
even more unwieldy.
The analysis becomes more problematic when the FORDHAM Note argues, supra note 66, at 419,
that courts should balance interests against effects-an ill-advised amalgamation of the standards of
Timberlane and Alcoa. Finally, that Note's concern for adequacy of alternative fora, id. at 418, mis-
apprehends the clear holdings of Reyno and Gilbert which make this a virtually insignificant concern.
See infra note 126.
95. For definitions of forum non conveniens, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 507
(1947) ("The principle of forum non conveniens is simply that a court may resist imposition upon its
jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute."); Dalnow,
The Inappropriate Forum, 29 ILL L. Rv. 867, 869 (1935) (court may refuse jurisdiction over case
brought in forum not "appropriate" for such suit); BLACK's LAW DiCTIONARY 589 (5th ed. 1979)
("Term refers to discretionary power of court to decline jurisdiction when convenience of parties and
ends of justice would be better served if action were brought and tried in another forum.").
96. The general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1982), states, "For the convenience of parties
and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other
district or division where it might have been brought."). That statute does not preclude aforum non
conveniens approach. Although § 1404(a) substituted a transfer requirement for a provision allowing
dismissal of a suit, Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 639 (1964), this transfer of law requirement
applies only under the venue statute-not under common law. See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 253-54 (per-
mitting dismissal underforum non conveniens). Forum non conveniens, rather than § 1404(a), ap-
plies in cases where the action should have been brought in a foreign tribunal rather than an Ameri-
can court. See Miskow v. Boeing Co., 664 F.2d 205, 207 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1020
(1982); Prack v. Weissinger, 276 F.2d 446, 450 (4th Cir. 1960); Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co.,
234 F.2d 633, 645 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956).
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lenge to the subject matter jurisdiction of the court per se, but rather an
assertion of the impropriety of that particular court's exercising its juris-
diction over the case97 because litigation in such an inconvenient forum
amounts to an illegitimate exercise of state power." Courts consider the
motion before reaching any of the underlying legal issues of the case."
American courts have relied upon forum non conveniens, even if not
always by name, 00 as part of their inherent power to control their own
docket and expedite court business, 01 as well as to define the "territorial
limits on national legislation."10 2 The criteria relevant to forum non con-
veniens dismissals are not rigid, thus allowing courts flexibility to respond
to various fact situations.1 03 Nevertheless, the forum non conveniens crite-
ria are more manageable and suited to judicial capabilities1" than are the
Timberlane factors. Rather than balancing conflicting economic and polit-
ical interests by parsing foreign statutes and legislative histories, as
Timberlane requires, forum non conveniens involves comparing "the bur-
dens of suit in this forum to those of suit in the home forum"' 1 5 in order
to determine whether trial in the American forum would "establish...
oppressiveness and vexation to a defendant . . . out of all proportion to
plaintiff's convenience."1 06
The Supreme Court clearly set forth the factors for striking such a bal-
ance in Gulf Oil v. Gilbert:
97. See Blair, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens In Anglo-American Law, 29 CoLum. L.
REv. 1, 2-3 (1929).
98. See F. MANN, supra note 21, at 40 (quoting DAHM, V6LKERRECHT (1958-61)).
99. See Recent Developments, 44 FORDHAM L. REv. 402, 419-20 (1975).
100. As one author noted, American courts had long relied on the doctrine "with such little con-
sciousness of what they were doing as to remind one of Moliere's M. Jourdain, who found he had
been speaking prose all his life without knowing it." Blair, supra note 97, at 21-22 (referring to
Moliere, Le Bourgeois Gentilhomme, act II, sc. vi).
101. See Blair, supra note 97, at 1. At least one author has argued that courts do not have and
should not exercise discretion in determining their jurisdiction. See FORDHAm Note, supra note 66, at
417. This approach is dearly incorrect for the reasons identified infra at notes 127-37 and accompa-
nying text. Further, such an argument cuts against that author's own proposal in that any attempt to
scale back application of American law runs contrary to the traditionalist claim that Congress in-
tended to create jurisdiction running to the limits of the law.
102. Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 70
YALE L.J. 259, 286 (1960).
103. See Reyno, 454 U.S. at 249-50.
104. Forum non conveniens is a mode of analysis that courts are capable of applying effectively.
See Redish, Due Process, Federalism, and Personal Jurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw.
U.L. REv. 1112, 1138 (1981) ("[I]t should not be an impossible task for a court to determine whether
litigation in a particular forum will be truly burdensome or unfair to the defendant."); Barrett, The
Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 C^i_ L. REv. 380, 420 (1947). Further, judges have much
experience in applying forum non conveniens analysis. See Note, The Convenient Forum Abroad
Revisited: A Decade of Development of the Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in International
Litigation in the Federal Courts, 17 VA. J. INT'L L. 755, 756-57 (1977).
105. Redish, supra note 104, at 1137.
106. Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947).
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Forum Non Conveniens
Important considerations are the relative ease of access to sources of
proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling,
and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; . . . and
all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expedi-
tious and inexpensive. There may also be questions as to the enforce-
ability of a judgment if one is obtained. 07
B. Advantages of the Forum Non Conveniens Approach
The Gilbert factors are especially useful in determining convenience in
international antitrust cases. Such actions are among the most complex to
litigate because they rely so heavily on massive amounts of documentary" 8
and testimonial' 0 9 evidence. Subpoena and discovery of corporate records
is necessary to prove or refute the existence of agreements to engage in
concerted action, boycotts, predatory pricing, and the like."0 Various cor-
porate officers must be available for testimony or deposition."' Both par-
ties must be able to marshall large numbers of documents" 2 and subject
them to computer-assisted analysis"' by economists retained as expert
witnesses in order to determine relevant markets, degrees of concentration,
anticompetitive effects, levels of competition and competitive injury, price
elasticity, and price leadership."" Indeed, expert testimony can be ex-
cluded in American courts unless the expert has thorough knowledge of
industry conditions in order to attest to the accuracy of the data." 5 Absent
access to the relevant data through discovery and absent opportunity for
the experts of each party to analyze this data,"' a meaningful court deci-
sion is impossible." 7 Access to testimony and evidence is precisely what
makes a trial most "easy, expeditious and inexpensive" in antitrust cases.
When meaningful access is not possible, courts should decline jurisdiction
and send the parties to courts better positioned to obtain the information
necessary for a decision.
Determining which forum is most convenient, based on Gilbert criteria,
107. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508.
108. 16-I J. VON KALINOWSKI, BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE
REGULATION § 110.02 (1984).
109. Id. § 110.03.
110. Id. § 110.01[2].
111. Id. § 112.05[131.
112. Id. § 110.01[2].
113. Id. § 110.01[2], at 110-7.
114. Id. §§ 110.03, 110.0111], at 110-3.
115. Id. § 110.03, at 110-30.
116. Id. § 110.01[2], at 110-6-7.
117. Id. § 110.03. Expert witnesses are necessary because lay courts and juries are unable to
synthesize and simplify the evidence sufficiently to understand the issues in the case. Indeed, some
courts find it necessary to retain their own economic specialists to act as neutral advisors. Id.
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is more in keeping with the court's proper role in approaching jurisdic-
tional questions with international implications. This is because forum
non conveniens utilizes purely juridical rather than political factors. Gil-
bert affirmatively directs courts to refuse to decide cases where adequate
access to documents or testimony of witnesses or defendants is unavailable.
It removes from the court the responsibility for balancing policy interests
of various nations, a salient feature of nonjusticiable questions. It provides
the "well-developed principles" '18 necessary to resolve cases in a princi-
pled fashion.119 Finally, because the Gilbert factors direct courts to con-
sider the enforceability of any judgment rendered, forum non conveniens
allows explicit consideration of the effects that a decision might have on
court integrity.'2 Because the forum non conveniens approach is con-
sistent with the court's proper role in cases having diplomatic conse-
quences, 121 it is preferable to interest analysis.
Where the factors of convenience counsel that a case is better heard
elsewhere, courts should decline jurisdiction. Forum non conveniens is a
method of analysis that courts can and have applied to dismiss sensitive
cases.1 22 Because application of forum non conveniens will lead to dismis-
118. See Jaffe, supra note 64, at 1304.
119. Determination of convenience is a traditional function of the courts. See, e.g., Schertenleib v.
Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1164-65 (2d Cir. 1978) (controversy over management of mutual funds held
in Switzerland dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds); Del Rio v. Ballenger Corp., 391 F.
Supp. 1002, 1004-05 (D. S.C. 1975) (dismissal on forum non conveniens motion of tort claim arising
in Panama against American corporation).
120. As noted supra note 50, Timberlane does provide for consideration of the enforceability of
American court judgments as part of its interest analysis. But there is little reason to assume that the
enforceability question would prompt a court to decline jurisdiction, given the political emphasis of the
interest factors, and the fact that no court to date has assigned significant weight to enforceability. On
the other hand the forum non conveniens analysis, taken as a whole, places the presumption more
strongly against going forward in American court; to that extent such a determination would more
likely tip the presumption against American court jurisdiction.
121. The forum non conveniens approach would also result in predictability because when a
forum is inconvenient, courts would refuse jurisdiction. Foreign governments can structure their econ-
omies without fear that erratically applied American law will upset their long-range policies. See
Barrett, supra note 104, at 402-03.
122. In addition to those cases cited supra note 119, see Reyno, 454 U.S. at 257-61 (affirming
dismissal of tort claim to Scotland); Mizokami Bros. of Arizona v. Baychem Corp., 556 F.2d 975, 977
(9th Cir. 1977) (dismissal onforum non conveniens grounds of suit by American plaintiff against
Mexican and German defendants over chemical contamination of goods purchased by plaintiff), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978); Paper Operations Consultants Int'l v. Steamship Hong Kong Amber,
513 F.2d 667, 672 (9th Cir. 1975) (suit dismissed because necessary documents, unobtainable in
United States court, could be had in foreign forum); Fitzgerald v. Westland Marine, 369 F.2d 499,
501 (2d Cir. 1966) (cost of transporting witnesses from alternate forum caused court to dismiss suit);
Abouchalache v. Hilton Int'l, 464 F. Supp. 94, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd mern. sub nom. Collins v.
Hilton Int'l, 628 F.2d 1344 (2d Cir. 1980) (suit dismissed under forum non conveniens because
premises in question in England); Mitchell v. General Motors, 439 F. Supp. 24, 27-28 (N.D. Ohio
1977) (suit dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds because of necessity of applying Ontario
law); Texaco Trinidad v. Astro Exito Navegacion S.A., Panama, 437 F. Supp. 331, 334 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (granting forum non conveniens motion dismissing maritime action to Trinidad); Dorizos v.
Lemos & Pateras, Ltd., 437 F. Supp. 120, 123 (S.D. Ala. 1977) (suit dismissed due to cost of bring-
ing witnesses from alternate forum); Papageorgiou v. Lloyds of London, 436 F. Supp. 701, 703 (E.D.
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sal of those cases not properly tried in American courts, it deals with the
fundamental foreign objection-the opposition to American jurisdiction
over cases involving fundamental decisions by foreign governments about
how to structure their economies. Forum non conveniens, by refusing cer-
tain parties their desired forum, leaves them to pursue their claims in
foreign tribunals or with the political departments where such claims
more properly belong. The nation whose courts are best able to render a
just verdict,123 as determined by convenience factors,124 would bear the
obligation of trying the case in accordance with its own laws,12 5 and will
prescribe the remedy available to the plaintiff.12 '
Pa. 1977) (suit dismissed because witnesses available in alternate forum were not amenable to service
of process by United States court); Harrison v. Capivary, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1141, 1142-43 (E.D.
Mo. 1971) (mem.) (forum non conveniens dismissal of contract claim between American plaintiff and
Paraguayan corporation).
123. The FORDHAM Note, supra note 66, is concerned with the interests of the individual liti-
gants, id. at 422 ("[I]t is extremely unfair that the litigants' interests should be ignored in favor of
'larger policies.'"), and with maximizing the enforcement of American antitrust law, id. at 419. In
contrast, this Note focuses on the ability of a court to render justice, and adopts an internationalist
perspective, ultimately concerned with facilitating international commerce and with persuading Amer-
ican courts to adopt a less parochial view. It is precisely the function of jurisdiction to allocate the
burden and cost of suit in an inconvenient forum, for the forum convenient for one party in an
international case will be inconvenient for the other. "[Tihe question is which party it should be."
Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court Jurisdiction, 1980 Sup.
CT. Rav. 77, 92. Courts may allocate this burden because an American citizen does not have an
unqualified right to sue in American court on his own behalf, Mizokami Bros., 556 F.2d at 977;
Vanity Fair Mills, 234 F.2d at 645. Further, Reyno makes clear that the individual plaintiff has no
right to an equally advantageous alternate forum, see infra note 126.
An awareness of the need to adjust our traditional legal doctrines to "the expanding horizons of
American[s]. . .who seek business in all parts of the world" is evident in the Supreme Court's ruling
in The Breman v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 11 (1972). The Court there upheld a forum
selection clause in a contract between an American oil drilling operation and a West German towing
concern. The Court recognized that we live "in an era of expanding world trade and commerce," and
that a rigid doctrine of expansive jurisidiction for American courts "would be a heavy hand indeed on
the future development of international commercial dealings by Americans." Id. at 9. Exaggerated
concern with ousting American courts of jurisdiction was based on "hardly more than a vestigial legal
fiction" and reflected "something of a provincial attitude regarding the fairness of other tribunals." Id.
at 12.
124. All factors of convenience will almost never cut in one direction. But such factors need not be
so favorable to one forum or the other as to be "overwhelming." Reyno, 454 U.S. at 257-58. The trial
courts must be vested with discretion to determine, on balance, which forum will pose "fewer eviden-
tiary problems." Id. at 258.
125. Forum non conveniens, unlike the conflict of laws approach of Timberlane, is consistent
with the Supreme Court's holding that the need to apply foreign law creates a presumption favoring
dismissal. Reyno, 454 U.S. at 260-61.
126. In order to invoke forum non conveniens, there must be at least one other forum in which
the maker of the motion is amenable to process. Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 506-07. At issue is whether the
alternative forum must provide a remedy which could be described as "adequate" or "equivalent."
The most recent decision of the Supreme Court on the subject, Reyno, states unequivocally that possi-
ble change in substantive law governing the remedy is an insubstantial, though not insignificant,
concern. 454 U.S. at 247-49.
The Court only generally discussed how inadequate the remedy available elsewhere must be before
courts should evince concern. "Of course, if the remedy provided by the alternative forum is so clearly
inadequate or unsatisfactory that it is no remedy at all, the unfavorable change in law may be given
substantial weight; the district court may conclude that dismissal would not be in the interests of
justice." Id. at 254. The Court offered no explanation or criteria as to what constituted a remedy "so
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C. Propriety of the Forum Non Conveniens Approach
Although one might argue that Congress has determined that United
States antitrust law should extend to the very cases that courts would re-
fuse to hear on forum non conveniens grounds,12 7 courts need not hesitate
to apply the forum non conveniens approach to international antitrust
cases. 128 First, Congress has not spoken unequivocally to the issue of ex-
clearly inadequate" as to be "no remedy at all." The Court eschewed reliance on any one factor,
fearing that such recognition would destroy the flexibility that is the hallmark of the forum non
conveniens doctrine. Id. at 249-50. Given this extremely low requirement, the question of remedy
ordinarily will be irrelevant to a court's consideration of aforum non conveniens motion. An alterna-
tive forum must be provided, but it apparently need not be a sympathetic one.
Thus, Sabena is in error when it suggests that forum non conveniens is inapplicable on the
grounds that the doctrine requires a "second forum that can fully resolve the plaintiff's claims." 731
F.2d at 936 (emphasis supplied). Such an assertion is contrary to Reyno. 454 U.S. at 254.
127. For example, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in an appeal of the
on-going Laker suit, recognized that the Anglo-American antitrust dispute was a festering one reflect-
ing a conflict "between deeply felt and long held economic and political policies," Sabena, 731 F.2d at
941 n.121, but conceded that the court was powerless to act in the face of "strongly mandated legisla-
tive policies" embodied in the Sherman Act, 731 F.2d at 916. But see Kintner & Griffin, supra note
10, at 202 ("It was left to the courts, however, to decide the circumstances under which the Sherman
Act would apply to what effectively were foreign transactions.").
Some question the legitimacy of attempts by courts to dismiss actions where there exists a plausible
claim of a congressional requirement that the case be heard. Professor Maier, for example, has argued
that:
[s]ince courts in these cases are always operating under legislative language that on its face
suggests that the statute is applicable to the foreign events or persons involved, there is some
anomaly in a court's finding that a regulation may be applied without violating international
jurisdictional standards but that the congressional command will not be followed if the court
determines that as a matter of policy the regulation is inappropriately applied.
Maier, supra note 54, at 299 (emphasis in original); see also Kadish, supra note 66, at 149 ("dissatis-
faction with the effects test . . . does not provide a principled basis of authority for restricting the
statutory language of the Sherman Act. . . . [M]ere judicial dissatisfaction with a legislative enact-
ment does not give the judiciary the authority to rewrite the law."); RahI, supra note 66, at 363
(same).
128. Although the Fifth Circuit has held thatforum non conveniens is not available in any anti-
trust action, Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui, 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), its reasoning is
erroneous. In Mitsui, the court denied a motion to dismiss an action to be tried in Indonesia by relying
on an older Supreme Court opinion, United States v. National City Lines, 334 U.S. 573 (1948)
[hereinafter cited as National City Lines 1], handed down before Congress enacted the venue statute
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
But Mitsui misread a subsequent Supreme Court decision following the enactment of § 1404(a),
United States v. National City Lines, 337 U.S. 78 (1949) [hereinafter cited as National City Lines III,
which effectively rejected the reasoning of National City Lines I, and removed the proscription against
reliance on forum non conveniens in an antitrust context. In National City Lines II, the court con-
cluded that by enacting § 1404(a) Congress intended to apply the transfer statute only to "any civil
action," 337 U.S. at 80-81, and hence that National City Lines I was not a bar to transferring an
antitrust action from Los Angeles to Chicago on forum non conveniens grounds.
Mitsui attempted to distinguish National City Lines 11 by arguing that since the Court did not
explicitly extend its ruling to the common law doctrine, that portion of National City Lines I preclud-
ing application offorum non conveniens still stands. 671 F.2d at 890-91 & n.18. It cannot reasonably
be argued, however, that Congress or the Court sought to preserve the goals outlined in National City
Lines I-avoiding denial of the plaintiff's choice of forum, protracting litigation, and scattering defen-
dants while concomitantly allowing change of venue. The same problems are as relevant in a transfer
as in a dismissal.
Moreover, to impose a per se rule against applying forum non conveniens to an antitrust case
would result in burdensome restrictions on the courts, in direct contradiction of the Supreme Court's
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traterritorial Sherman Act jurisdiction,129 leaving the courts to decide the
reach of the Sherman Act. 13  Hence, courts are free to scale back Judge
Learned Hand's effects test. Alcoa, which has been viewed as a touch-
stone, crumbles to dictum."'
Second, it is simply inherent in the doctrine of forum non conveniens
that courts will exhaust adjudicative jurisdiction1 3 ' and dismiss a case even
where legislative jurisdiction 3 3 would go further. Were this not so, the
convenient forum doctrine would be meaningless, for how could a court
both exercise the full measure of legislative jurisdiction, and at the same
time decline to hear a case because it could better be heard elsewhere?1 '
recent recognition of the "need to retain flexibility" in applying forum non conveniens, and of its
refusal to "lay down a rigid rule to govern discretion." Reyno, 454 U.S. at 249. Given the confusion
over the precise holdings of National City Lines I and II, and the longstanding tradition of extending
forum non conveniens to all civil actions, unless and until Congress explicitly acts to restrict the free
exercise of a forum non conveniens motion, courts should not unilaterally do so.,
129. See K. BREWSTER, supra note 18, at 72-73 (unclear what Congress meant; Alcoa merely
one interpretation); Hawk, supra note 2, at 202 ("In 1890 Congress paid little or no attention to the
Sherman Act's application in international trade. . . .[T]he legislative history provides no effective
guidance as to either the application of the Sherman Act in international trade or the policies and
national interests that should inform that application."); Ongman, "Be No Longer a Chaos". Con-
structing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71 Nw.
U.L. REv. 733, 738 n.20 (1977) (legislative history of Sherman Act spare to begin with, but "simply
useless in dealing with specific fact situations in American foreign trade.").
130. A careful parsing of the congressional response to the revisions in jurisdiction attempted by
Timberlane demonstrates congressional approval of adjudicative jurisdiction that falls short of the full
reach of legislative jurisdiction. Cf. Note, Jurisdiction Over Foreign States for Acts of Their Instru-
mentalities: A Model for Attributing Liability, 94 YALE L.J. 394, 413 & n.85 (legIslative history of
Export Trading Company Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-290, 96 Stat. 1233, codified at 15 U.S.C. §
6(a) (1982), supports view that court should consider comity in cases with international
repercussions).
131. The Sherman Act is unusual in the expansive interpretation courts afforded its jurisdiction.
Previously, questions of extraterritorial jurisdiction had arisen only in relatively simple criminal cases.
See Haight, International Law and Extraterritorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE
L.J. 639, 643-45 (1954) (criminal laws historically given extraterritorial application only in narrow
circumstances; justification for extending jurisdiction not applicable to antitrust laws); Note, Extrater-
ritorial Application of United States Laws: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 28 STAN. L. Rxv. 1005,
1007-10 (1976) (discussing historical reticence of American courts to imply extraterritorial reach of
American law, absent explicit Congressional directive).
132. Adjudicative jurisdiction comprehends "the willingness of a. . .society to furnish the law-
applying agency-usually, but not necessarily, a court-for the adjudication of a matter involving
significant elements that are not domestic to that society." A. von Mehren, Adjudicatory Jurisdiction:
General Theories Compared and Evaluated, 63 B.U.L. REv. 279, 283 (1983); cf. FTC v. Com-
pagnie de Saint-Gobain-Pont-A-Mousson, 636 F.2d 1300, 1315-18 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (uses terms "ju-
risdiction to prescribe" and "jurisdiction to enforce").
133. Legislative jurisdiction "is the power of a state to apply its law to create or affect legal
interests," Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 COLuM. L. Rxv. 1587, 1587 (1978), and it marks the
"outer limits for choice of law," Stevenson, The Relationship of Private International Law to Public
International Law, 52 CoLUM. L. REv. 561, 563 n.13 (1952).
134. Courts can decline on forum non conveniens grounds the full exercise of jurisdiction permit-
ted by Congress. Canada Malting v. Paterson S.S., 285 U.S. 413, 422-23 (1932); Paper Operations
Consultants Int'l v. Steamship Hong Kong Amber, 513 F.2d 667, 670 (9th Cir. 1975).
In Sabbatino the Court upheld abstention based on the act of state doctrine. Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964) ("[T]he Judicial Branch will not examine the validity of
a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign government.").
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Indeed, one can only make sense of the Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno deci-
sion by accepting the validity of incongruent legislative and adjudicative
jurisdiction.
Third, as developed above,"35 separation of powers considerations pro-
vide courts with power to decline jurisdiction in international antitrust
cases on forum non conveniens grounds. These international cases turn
largely on political and diplomatic considerations that courts are simply
not competent to resolve.13 6 Applying interest analysis calls into question
the competence and legitimacy of the Third Branch as an instititution.
137
Courts can and must decline to become entangled in such litigation.
CONCLUSION
This Note proposes that courts substitute juridical factors of forum non
conveniens for political decisionmaking in resolving extraterritorial anti-
trust suits. This approach represents the only means by which courts can
effectively and legitimately render verdicts, and it removes judges from the
political thicket that, under both the expansive effects test of Alcoa and
Timberlane's interest analysis, is unavoidable.
Moreover, the approach set forth in this Note may provide an effective
means of mitigating the international controversy that usually attends the
application of the Sherman Act to international business transactions.
Plaintiffs would find American courts less available as vehicles to disrupt
or thwart the political and economic choices of other sovereign govern-
ments. Convenience analysis would allow courts to dismiss nettlesome
cases, with only tangential American contacts, to foreign tribunals better
positioned to secure the evidence and witnesses necessary to a meaningful
adjudication of the controversy. By minimizing diplomatic conflict while
enhancing the possibility of a proper determination of the claim, conve-
nience analysis will help prevent the quarrels of commerce from degener-
ating into the quarrels of nations.
-John Byron Sandage
135. See supra text accompanying notes 59-80.
136. See Currie, supra note 60, at 176.
137. See Scharpf, supra note 61, at 576.
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